The short answer
Vendor Remote Access
Vendor remote access should be enabled by the utility for a specific session, to a specific system, by a named person with multi-factor authentication, through a jump host that logs and preferably records the session, and then disabled. Persistent vendor connections, shared accounts, consumer remote-desktop tools on SCADA servers, and vendor-installed modems are the patterns that have led to incidents, and each is replaced by a control in this design.
Key points
- The utility enables the session and disables it. Access is never standing.
- Named accounts per person at the vendor, with MFA, and removal when they leave.
- All vendor sessions land on a jump host in the DMZ and go no further than the system in the ticket.
- Record or at least log every session. The recording is how a change is traced later.
- Find and remove vendor-installed modems and remote tools. They are the access path you do not control.
Why this deserves its own page
Every utility has people outside it who legitimately need to reach the control system: the integrator who built the SCADA system, the pump vendor who supports the drives, the membrane supplier who monitors the skid, the radio vendor. Their access is useful and often written into a support contract. It is also, repeatedly, the path by which control systems have been compromised, because vendor access tends to be set up once for convenience and never looked at again.
A widely reported 2021 incident at a Florida water treatment plant involved a remote desktop tool with a shared password on a SCADA workstation. Whoever was ultimately responsible for what happened that day, the lesson stood on its own: shared credentials on a consumer remote tool with no session control is not vendor access. It is an open door with a vendor standing near it.
The patterns that go wrong
| Pattern | Why it is common | What goes wrong |
|---|---|---|
| Consumer remote desktop tool on the SCADA server | Free, easy, works through any firewall | Reaches the internet directly from the control zone; shared password; no record of who connected; software the utility cannot patch or audit |
| Vendor-installed cellular modem | The vendor needed support access and the utility network was inconvenient | A conduit the utility did not draw, with credentials the utility does not hold, on a device that is never updated |
| Shared vendor account | One login for the whole support desk | No accountability; the password outlives every employee who knew it; cannot be revoked for one person |
| Standing VPN for the vendor | Set up during commissioning and left on | The vendor network becomes part of the utility attack surface; a compromised vendor laptop is inside |
| Direct access to controllers | The vendor connects straight to the PLC from wherever they are | No jump host, no logging, and the vendor laptop is now on the control network with whatever it carries |
The design
The controls below fit together. Each one addresses a specific failure in the table above.
- 1
Utility-initiated access
The vendor requests a session, by phone, email, or ticket. A utility employee enables the access, whether by turning on the VPN account, opening the firewall rule for a time window, or physically connecting something. When the work is done the access is disabled. The default state is off.
- 2
Named accounts with MFA
Each vendor employee who may connect has their own account, tied to their name, with multi-factor authentication. The vendor notifies the utility when someone leaves and the account is removed. No account is shared.
- 3
A jump host in the DMZ
The vendor session terminates on a hardened jump host in the industrial DMZ, not on a SCADA server or a PLC. From the jump host, a second connection is made to the target system, using the tools installed on the jump host. The vendor laptop never touches the control network.
- 4
Least reach
The firewall between the jump host and the control zone allows the jump host to reach only the system named in the ticket, for the duration of the session. Reaching one PLC does not mean reaching all of them.
- 5
Session recording and logging
The jump host logs the connection, and where possible records the session as video or a keystroke log. Every change made by a vendor is then traceable. The recording is also what proves a vendor did not do something.
- 6
Utility oversight
An operator watches the session on the HMI, or at least is present and knows what the vendor intends to do. A vendor changing a controller program on a live process is a change with operational consequences, not just a security event.
- 7
Documented change
What the vendor did goes into the change log, with the program backup taken before and after. Vendor work is the most common source of undocumented changes.
Contracts and expectations
Access arrangements outlive the people who set them up, so the terms belong in the support contract, not in an email. Useful clauses cover named-account provisioning and removal, the notification the vendor must give before connecting, the systems the vendor may access, the utility right to monitor and record sessions, the vendor responsibility for the security of the connecting laptop, and the requirement that no vendor-supplied remote access device or software be installed without the utility writing it into the conduit inventory. IEC 62443-2-4 is the reference for what to ask of an integrator or service provider.
Finding the access you did not authorize
Existing systems accumulate access paths. Before the design above means anything, the old paths have to be found and closed.
- Walk every panel and enclosure for cellular modems, DSL modems, and radios that are not on the network drawing. Follow every cable that leaves a control switch.
- List the software on every SCADA server and workstation and remove remote desktop tools that are not part of the designed path.
- Review the firewall rules and the VPN accounts for anything belonging to a vendor, and for anything with no owner.
- Ask each vendor how they currently connect. The answer is often surprising to both parties.
- Check the controllers for web servers and services with default credentials that a vendor enabled for convenience.
Vendors that need continuous access
Some arrangements are legitimately continuous: a membrane vendor monitoring skid performance, a drive vendor collecting diagnostics, a cloud analytics service. Handle these as one-way data flows out of the control zone through the DMZ, using a data diode or a strictly outbound connection, so the vendor receives data but cannot reach in. Any capability to change something on site stays behind the session-based access described above. Monitoring and control are different conduits, and only one of them needs to exist all the time.
Frequently asked questions
- The vendor says their remote tool is secure. Is that enough?
- The tool may well be secure. The question is whether the utility controls the session: who connects, when, to what, with what record. A secure tool that the vendor can use at any time without the utility knowing fails on every one of those. Use the vendor tool if it fits, but only through the utility jump host and the utility switch.
- How do we handle an emergency at 2 a.m. when no one is at the plant?
- The on-call operator enables the access remotely through the same path that operators use, which is itself MFA-protected and logged. An emergency is the case where a recorded session matters most, not the case where the controls are skipped.
- Should the integrator have a permanent account?
- A permanent named account with MFA that is disabled between sessions is reasonable and avoids re-provisioning every time. Permanent access, meaning the account can connect at any time without the utility enabling it, is not.
- What about the vendor connecting on site with their laptop?
- On-site access still goes through the utility. The vendor laptop connects to a designated engineering port or to the jump host, not to an arbitrary control switch, and the same logging applies. A laptop that has been on other customer networks is not less risky because its owner is standing in the room.
Related topics
- Zones and ConduitsThe IEC 62443 way to segment a control system: grouping assets into zones with a shared security level, inventorying every conduit between them, and turning the drawing into firewall rules. With a worked water utility example.
- The Purdue ModelThe reference architecture most segmentation designs still start from: what each level contains, where the DMZ goes, and how it maps to a water utility.
- Water and Wastewater Utility Threat LandscapeWhat has actually happened at water utilities, what those incidents had in common, and the small number of controls that would have prevented most of them.
- Controller HardeningWhat can be locked down on a PLC or RTU: keyswitch and mode, credentials, unused services, access lists, firmware, and the engineering workstation that is the real target.
- IEC 62443The international standard series for industrial automation and control system security: how it is organized, what security levels and foundational requirements mean, and how a utility or integrator actually uses it.
- VPN DesignHow a VPN fits remote access for a control system: it terminates in the DMZ and lands on a jump host, never the control network; site-to-site tunnels carry telemetry; user tunnels require multi-factor and individual accounts; the concentrator is patched fast.
Direct contact
Have a controls question?
Reach Eric Sullivan directly about anything on this site, a controls or automation topic, or one of his personal projects.